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BANK NIGHTS: ARE THEY LOTTERIES?
HISTORY.
T HE winning of property by chance-by lot-was undoubt-
edly known to the ancients. Throughout the Old Testa-
ment may be found such references to this method of distri-
bution as: "They parted my garments amongst them: and
upon my vesture they cast lots * * *" 1 "Thou art grown old,
and advanced in age, and there is a very large country left,
which is not yet divided by lot ** **1 " 2 The merit that at-
tached itself to this method of distribution, obviously, is that
it quieted contention and disposed of any charge of favoritism
in the allocation of the property distributed.
But such parceling of awards by lot seldom was the
result of the payment of, or the agreement to pay, a consid-
eration. Just where this element of the lottery was first
injected is problematical, but it seems clear that the earliest
record of a lottery drawing, for a consideration, is to be found
in the Low Countries (Ghent, Bruges, L'Ecluse) from 1443
to 1449.- The town accounts of L'Ecluse indicate that lot-
teries were drawn in 1445 and in 1446: "the first with 4,304
tickets, the second with 4,271, all at 3s. 2d. gr." the complete
prize-awards amounting to 1,737 florins (de Rhin) or
£275 5s. gr. (Flanders).- At least one of these lotteries was
held with the object of raising 10,000 saluts d'or for walls
and fortifications. 5 Because hundreds of letters adver-
tising this lottery were mailed to other countries, it is obvious
that the English were aware of the existence of this game by
the time Queen Elizabeth, in 1567, commanded that a lottery
be held in England "towardes the reparation of the havens
and strength of the Realme, and towardes such other pub-
lique good works." 6 We note that there were to be four
hundred thousand lots "and no more", and every lot-or
'OLD TESTAMENT, Psalm XXI, 19.
'OLD TESTAMENT, Josue XXIII, 1.
IEWEN, LoTERIES AND SWEEPSTAKES (1932) 25.
'EWEN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 26.
'EWEN, 10c. cit. supra note 3.
' EWEN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 36.
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chance-was to cost only ten shillings. The prizes were to be
partly in money, partly in "plate gilte and white" and partly
in linens and tapestries.7 And so anxious, or greedy, was
Good Queen Bess about the success of her enterprise, that
she provided that anyone who wanted to visit any of the cities
-London, Oxford, Southampton, Dublin, Waterford-for
the purpose of investing in- the game, could go to such cities
and stay there seven days:
"without any molestation or arrest of them for any
manner of offence, saving treason, murder, pyracie,
or any other felonie, or for breach of her Majesties
peace, during the time of their coming, abiding or
retourne." 8
However, despite tbis evidence of the Queen's interest in the
state lottery, or because of the suspicion on the part of the
commoners that the choice prizes might be awarded to court
favorites, only one-twelfth of the amount anticipated was
collected, thus reducing the list of prizes from £100,000 to
about £9,000. 9 The royal lottery was a failure and no doubt
the royal ministers received a warm reception from their
forceful and, at times, avaricious ruler, when they announced
to her the disappointing results of her attempts to raise funds
by appealing to the cupidity of her "loving" subjects. How-
ever, lotteries still continued in England, either operating di-
rectly under the royal aegis or under a license granted by
the crown to some favorite, or to some contractor who agreed
to erect public works if granted the privilege of conducting a
lottery to defray the expenses thereof.
In fact, this latter feature-a lottery for the benefit of
the Commonwealth-is inextricably bound up with the his-
tory and the development of our own country, as may be evi-
denced from the following:
The settlement at Jamestown, Virginia, in 1607, was
made at the expense of a small group of Englishmen who
contributed funds to what they considered an undertaking,
7 Ibid.8 EWEN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 37.
EwEN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 62.
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partly political and partly speculative. After five years of
hardships, the promoters of the settlement, realizing that
they could expect no immediate return on their investment,
and not wishing to lose what they had already contributed,
secured a new charter from the King 10 in 1612, in which
he permitted them to arrange for a public lottery, provided
the managers thereof would be put under oath:
"to the intent and purpose, that none of our loving
subjects, putting in their names, or otherwise adven-
turing in the said general lottery or lotteries, may be
in any wise defrauded and deceived of their said
monies, or evil or indirectly dealt withal in their said
adventures." 11
The lottery which, according to a hand-bill advertising it,
was to contain "five thousand pound in prizes certayne, be-
sides rewards of casualtie", was ultimately drawn in Lon-
don, and at least two churches were prize-winners. One, the
Church of St. Mary, in London, which had invested six-
pounds in the lottery, won "twoe spones price twentye shil-
linge", and the other church, which had taken fifty "lots",
or chances, at twelve pence each, won ten shillings. Whether
or not these "lots" or chances were taken by pious members
of the two congregations, with the churches as beneficiaries,
we do not know. But we do know that the churches were
insignificant prize winners, compared to a London tailor.
Thomas Sharpliss, who won the first prize of four thousand
crowns, "in fayre plate, which was sent to his house in a very
stately manner." The lottery yielded sixty thousand ducats
and much of this was used to pay for supplies and for re-
cruits for the Jamestown colony.
However, in a short time, the people in the towns of
England, through which the lottery agents had passed, sell-
ing tickets or "lots", began to complain loudly "of the de-
'0His interest naturally was to extend his realm by seeing to it that
English colonies should be established in the New World.I THREE PROCLAMATIONS CONCERNING THE LOTTERY FOR VIRGINIA, printed
for The John Carter Brown Library, Providence, R. I. (1907) : An indication
that some evils were to be found, even in those days, before "racketeers" became
a word understood in all households.
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moralization to business and industry caused by the popular
excitement over the lottery", and, in March, 1620 (or 1621),
the Commons requested the Privy Council to suspend lot-
teries. A proclamation to this effect was signed shortly
thereafter by the King, who explained therein that, when
he had previously granted permission for the Virginia lot-
tery to be arranged and drawn, he had so acted with his "eye
fired upon a religious and princely end and design." How-
ever, now that His Majesty discerned that the lotteries "do
dayly decline to more and more inconvenience, to the hin-
drance of multitudes of Our Subjects", he decided, "for the
generall good of Our Subjects", to suspend such lotteries in
any part of England-or its dominions-until further notice
from him.
But, in fairness to those charged with the management
of the so-called Virginia Lotteries, 12 let it be said that the
latter furnished the means of sending to the struggling colony
eight hundred recruits from over-seas who might, otherwise,
never have joined the plantation.13
To sum up, the lotteries in England were, from time to
time, authorized by the Crown, and, as abuses crept in, they
were suspended until finally prohibited by various acts of
Parliament.14 However, due to the success of the Irish
Sweepstakes (for the benefit of hospitals in the Irish Free
State),' agitation today is strong in England for the con-
duct of similar enterprises, and what is law there today, may
be repealed tomorrow.
As for the beginning of lotteries in the early days of this
country, it is likely that the English colonists who settled
here engaged in them, but there is a surprising scarcity of
literature on this subject. However, such devices were fre-
quently resorted to in the early history of Philadelphia, to
pave the streets, build wharves, etc., and, in 1748, a battery
' Several lotteries, for the same cause, had been held in the eight years
elapsing between 1612 and the date of their suspension.
"This data, together with all other references to this lottery, was gathered
from THREE PROCLAMATIONS CONCERNING THE LOTTERY FOR VIRGINIA, printed
for The John Carter Brown Library, Providence, R. I. (1907).
14 ENG. GAMING ACT, 1802; ENG. BETTING AND LOTTERIES ACT of 1934.
This lottery was legalized in the Irish Free State by the Public Charitable
Hospitals Act of the Parliament of the Irish Free State at Dublin.
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of cannon, to be located on the banks of the Delaware, below
the city, was secured by the same method.16
In 1750, Yale College availed itself of this device to
raise a building fund, and, in 1772, Harvard College ob-
tained $18,400 to build Stoughton Hall. And it is interesting
to note that the college, itself, drew the principal prize of
$10,000.17
Confirmation of the respectable status of the lottery in
the early years of our country's development may even be
found in our law reports, to wit:
"When the sources of public revenue were fewer than
now,. they were used in some or all of the States, and
even in the District of Columbia, to raise money for
the erection of public buildings, making public im-
provements, and not unfrequently for educational and
religious purposes." 18
And again:
"In 1820, the city of Albany was authorized by a stat-
ute to dispose of its public lands, by a lottery not to
exceed in amount 250,000." 19
But, in time, as our governing agencies began to use the
power to tax more and more drastically, lotteries, with their
evil appeal to those already impoverished, were eliminated,
until today they are prohibited in practically all the states of
our nation.20 But that does not mean that we have heard
the last of them.
As was said in a recent English case: 21
"There will seemingly never be any finality on the
question of what a lottery is. It has been said more
than once in judgments by members of this Court that
10These Colonial references are derived from EWEN, LOTTERIES AND
SWEEPSTAKES (1932) 31.
27 Ibid.
Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814, 818 (1879).
2 N. Y. Almshouse v. American Art Union, 7 N. Y. 228, 237 (1852).
38 C. J. (1914) 293, n. 72c.
= Coles v. Odhams Press, Ltd., 1 L. R. 416, 427, 428 (K. B. 1936).
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so soon as a particular scheme is declared by a deci-
sion of the Court to be a lottery, the skill and ingenuity
of a number of extremely able persons will be exer-
cised in trying to discover some means of avoiding the
effect of that decision." (Italics ours.)
And that same "skill and ingenuity" above referred to,
has, as its most recent and still current effort to evade the
lottery laws, devised a scheme commonly known as "Bank
Night". Its cause and its origin are now to be considered.
BANK NIGHT.
When, because of their reduced incomes, occasioned by
the recent depression which shook the financial structure of
our country to the point of collapse, our citizens found it
necessary to retrench, they quite naturally began their re-
trenching process where it would hurt them least-in the
field of luxuries. The first of these luxuries, or non-essentials,
was entertainment received from the theatres, and since, by
far, the greater part of our population finds its entertain-
ment in the cinema theatres of the nation, the moving-picture
industry was one of the first to feel the disastrous effect of
John Citizen's decision to curtail his hitherto generous ex-
penditures by abstaining from attendance at the "movies" or
"talkies".
As great numbers of former patrons of the cinema made
their visits to the box-office more and more infrequent, the
leaders of that industry, because of the millions of dollars
invested in it, became deeply worried. Without increased
patronage, failure was just around the corner. What to do?
Seek to entice the erstwhile movie patron back to his accus-
tomed theatre, of course! But how?
Many schemes were tried, ranging from showing double-
features, so called, for the price of one admission, all the way
down to giving away glass-ware, or sets of dishes, piece by
piece, on selected nights, to the ladies who patronized the
theatre. But these simple schemes did not attract the theatre-
goers in sufficient numbers. Other, and more effective, lures
1937]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
had to be found if the "movie" industry was to be saved
and, in 1931, a saviour came upon the scene in the person
of a Colorado theatre manager. For it was he who devised
the scheme we have already referred to as "Bank Night"
which soon swept the country like the proverbial wild-fire.22
"Bank Night", except for slight variations, is usually
played as follows: In the lobby of the theatre, a book is dis-
played and any person, over the age of eighteen years, may
register his name and address in the said book, whether he
purchase a ticket of admission to the theatre or not. Oppo-
site his signature is a serial number, already printed along
the margin of the page, and the theatre's manager causes a
card to be made out, bearing the name and address of the
registrant, together with the serial number opposite his name
in the aforesaid book. These cards are then placed in a
"permanent" container or receptacle.
On a fixed night each week, and at a certain hour there-
on, the container or receptacle is brought on the stage and
a card drawn therefrom, and two or three minutes are allowed
during which the registrant of the lucky card may step for-
ward and claim the sum of money set aside by the manage-
ment as a prize. The winning name is also called out in the
lobby and, if the said registrant be outside the theatre, he is
permitted to enter the theatre free of charge, claim his prize
and then leave. However, if the registrant of the card chosen
does not come forward in the allotted time, the prize is car-
ried over to the drawing to be held the following week and
added to the amount then to be distributed.
This advertising scheme, on the face of it, was designed
to appeal to the gambling instinct, common to so many indi-
viduals, and was devised to circumvent the law in many states
of our country regarding lotteries. The said law usually de-
scribes a lottery as a scheme or device whereby anything of
value, for a consideration, is allotted by chance. 23 By pro-
viding that non-purchasers, as well as purchasers of admis-
sion tickets, might register for the prize, the originator of the
scheme thought to evade the lottery law, on the ground that
' TIME, Vol. 24, No. 5 (Feb. 3, 1936).
= 38 C. J. (1914) 286-289, and citations thereunder.
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no "consideration" would be furnished by the non-purchaser.
But when the advertising device came into court, these hopes
did not materialize in most jurisdictions.
It became the duty of the writer to debate this proposi-
tion before the appellate courts in New York after a judg-
ment of conviction in the lower courts had been pronounced
on several defendants who had operated the scheme in ques-
tion, and who had been prosecuted for a violation of the lot-
tery laws of New York. Because the ultimate decision there-
in attracted nation-wide attention, it is perhaps best to dwell
at length upon the facts and the arguments presented upon
the appeal to help elucidate the law upon lotteries generally.
In the case under discussion, People v. Miller et al.,2 4
the scheme, or device, was known as the "Kentucky Derby",
but, in all its essentials, it was similar to "Bank Night", as
heretofore described. Free opportunity for non-purchasers
of admission tickets, as in "Bank Night", to participate in
a drawing for a cash prize, was the salient feature of the
plan which counsel for the appellants admitted was oper-
ated "in order to attract patrons to the additional amuse-
ment and entertainment afforded by the operation of the
game" of "Kentucky Derby".
Under Section 1370 of the Penal Law of New York, a
lottery is declared to be,
"* * * a scheme for the distribution of property by
chance among persons who have paid or agreed to pay
a valuable consideration for the chance whether called
a lottery, raffle or gift enterprise or by some other
name." (Italics ours.)
And, under Section 1376 of the same law, any person who
offers property for disposal, dependent upon the drawing of
a lottery, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Upon appeal from conviction, the defendants conceded
that they had distributed a prize by chance, or lot, but con-
tended that, since people could participate in the drawing by
"free" registration, there was an absence of the "valuable
"' People v. Miller, Cranides and Kiley, 271 N. Y. 44, 2 N. E. (2d) 38(1936).
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consideration" mentioned in Section 1370 aforesaid, and so
the law against lotteries had not been violated by them.
Before proceeding to the argument made on appeal in
this case, let us see what consideration, or "valuable consid-
eration", is:
"A 'valuable consideration' is defined in the books
to mean money, or any other thing, that bears a known
value." 25
"A 'valuable consideration' means, and necessa-
rily requires, under every form and kind of purchase,
something of actual value, capable, in the estimation
of the law, of pecuniary measurement." 26
"A good consideration is such as is founded on
natural duty and affection, or on a strong moral obli-
gation. A valuable consideration is founded on money,
or something convertible into money, or having a value
in money, except marriage, which is a valuable con-
sideration." 27
"It has been held that the rule as to consideration
does not mean that a scheme will be held a lottery only
where money is direcly given for the right to compete,
but that it is only necessary that the person entering
the competition shall do something or give up some
right, or that benefit may accrue to the person con-
ducting the scheme." 28 (Italics ours.)
To support their contention that the appellants had not
conducted a lottery, because "consideration" was absent, sev-
eral "authorities" in this and other jurisdictions were cited,
and it is with the latter that we shall deal first, making such
' Jackson v. Alexander, 3 Johns. 483, 488 (N. Y. 1790).
The Elmbank, 72 Fed. 610, 617 (U. S. 1896) ; 2 PomFRoY, EQ. JUR. (4th
ed. 1918) § 747.
BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910) 250.
38 C. J. (1914) 291, §7.
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comment upon them in the order of presentation as is deemed
advisable.
The first of these "authorities" is State of Iowm v.
H'undling,20 in which the court held that "Bank Night" was
not a lottery because, of the three elements universally re-
quired to constitute a lottery-prize, drawing, and consid-
eration flowing from the player to the donor of the prize-
the last named was missing, since there were registrants who
did not pay admission to the theatre who could participate
in the drawing. It is to be noted that Iowa has no statute
defining the term "lottery", so the court declared it had to
look
"to the generally accepted meaning of the term as
defined by the authorities, and if there be conflict
among the authorities, we must adopt the definition
which includes as an element the evil which the stat-
ute was obviously intended to prevent." 30 (Italics
ours.)
And, having looked at its own "authorities",3' the
learned Iowan tribunal found that the evil aimed at in the
statute was any gambling scheme "in which chances are sold
or disposed of for value and .the sums thus paid are hazarded
in the hope of winning a much larger sum".3 2 In other
words, the court believed that the old-fashioned schemes, such
as the Louisiana Lottery, were prohibited, but not the mod-
ern, embellished "gift-enterprises" of Bank Nights.
People v. Cardas 33 was also cited in behalf of Miller,
Cranides and Kiley, the appellants, that case holding:
"Certainly those who received prize tickets without
buying an admission ticket did not pay anything for
the chance of getting the prize. They did not hazard
anything of value."
State v. Hundling, 220 Iowa 1369, 264 N. W. 608 (1936).
'"Id. at 609 (264 N. W.).
'People v. Mail and Express Co., 231 N. Y. 586, 132 N. E. 898 (1921);
Yellow-Stone Kit v. State, 88 Ala. 196, 7 So. 338 (1890); People v. Cardas,
137 Cal. 788, 28 P. (2d) 99 (1933).
' See note 30, supra.
People v. Cardas, 137 Cal. 788, 28 P. (2d) 99 (1933).
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Suppose this point were conceded, what about those who
did pay admission? That question will be answered later.
Another case upon which the appellants relied, was
Yellow-Stone Kit v. State 31 where a "medicine-man" gave
away numbered tickets to all those who attended his "medi-
cine show" in which he performed certain feats and, between
acts, sold his medicines of alleged curative power. No charge
to attend these exhibitions was made until the final show was
to be given. On that night, when a "Jubilee performance"
was offered, there was an admission fee of ten cents charged.
After that performance, anybody was allowed to enter the
tent free of charge. Then the defendant threw upon the stage
a large quantity of numbered slips, duplicates of the num-
bered tickets which had been previously distributed, gratui-
tously, to all and sundry who hhd attended the previous
"medicine shows". Two children then came from the audi-
ence and picked up eight tickets from the stage. The eight
holders of the corresponding duplicates were the prize-win-
ners. "Even if some of them were not present on the night
of the drawing, their prizes would be delivered to their
homes." (Italics ours.) This generous fact had been adver-
tised and the court found out such a delivery had, in at least
one instance, been made.
These facts do not seem to be on "all fours" with those in-
volved in "Bank Night" because, in this Alabama case, any-
body could attend the entertainments each night (other than
the final night) and receive "chances" free, whether or not
they bought any of Kit's medicines. In this thought, we are
in the distinguished company of the Alabama Court of Ap-
peals which declared, in a very recent decision: 35
"Now a word as to the holding of our Supreme Court
in the Yellow-Stone Kit case. Beyond defining what
constitutes a lottery we cannot see that it has any
bearing upon the question raised by the present ap-
peal. There the chances dealt out were really and in
truth free chances." (Italics ours.)
"Yellow-Stone Kit v. State, 88 Ala. 196, 7 So. 338 (1890).
'Grimes v. State, - Ala. -, 174 So. 900 (1937).
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The "appeal" in this Alabama case arose out of the pros-
ecution of a theatre official who conducted a bank night in
conjunction with "matinee registration". In other words, if
one who had previously entered his name in the theatre's
registry did not intend to, or could not, be present on the
night of the drawing to claim the prize he might win, he
could arrange to call for it later, provided he had attended
the matinee that same day and signed and filed a matinee
registration card. The court condemned the scheme, point-
ing out that the price of the matinee ticket "is nevertheless
paid for the chance, plus the ticket or for the ticket, plus
the chance".
A return to the New York "authorities" of Miller,
Cranides and Kiley discloses that the appellants relied, pri-
marily, upon two cases in that jurisdiction in an effort to
secure a reversal of the judgment of conviction.
The first of these cases is Kohn v. Koehler, 3 6 but how
little justified the appellants were in leaning for support
upon this prop is readily discovered in an excerpt from
People v. Wolff37 which discussed the Kohn case at some
length:
"In the case of Kohn v. Koehler the action was'brought
to recover the penalties provided for by section 22, 1
Revised Statutes, page 665 (marginal paging) ; and it
is to be observed that the only lottery, game, or device
of chance, by whatever name it might be called, which
the Revised Statutes declared should be deemed un-
lawful and a common and public nuisance, was such
as had not been authorized by law (section 26) ; and
hence the court was construing the provisions of a
statute (section 29) by which it was declared unlaw-
ful to deal in lottery tickets, only when such lottery
was not expressly authorized by law. The lottery
scheme contained in the Austrian bonds was expressly
E96 N. Y. 362 (1884). In this case, Austrian bonds were sold to the
general public with an opportunity to the purchasers to win a prize of money
under certain conditions attending to the drawing of the bond numbers.
'1 14 App. Div. 73, 43 N. Y. Supp. 421 (1st Dept. 1897).
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authorized by law, and, therefore, under the Revised
Statutes was not illegal." 38
The court also declared that, if the Penal Code, instead of
the Revised Statutes, of New York had been involved, "it
may very well be held that such schemes come within the
prohibition of the Penal Code." 31
But the chief New York authority upon which the appel-
lants depended was People v. Mail and Express Co.40 There,
the defendant, a newspaper, distributed numbered coupons,
gratuitously, entitling the holders of the lucky numbers, later
to be drawn, to valuable gifts. It did not require holders of
these free coupons either to purchase or to subscribe to its
publication. On the contrary, it advertised places where one
could see the Evening Mail free of charge in order to ascertain
the lucky numbers that were drawn, entitling the holders of
the free coupons to a prize. The court held that, since the
holders of the coupons did not have to part with any con-
sideration to obtain them, nor pay to ascertain the lucky
numbers drawn, the acts complained of did not constitute a
lottery.
And the appellants argued that, "since the price of ad-
mission to the theatre was not raised and it was unnecessary
to purchase a ticket of admission to the theatre in order to
win a prize", the case under discussion was analogous to
People v. Mail and Express C0o. 4 1 Apparently the argument
was unavailing-but, since most of the jurisdictions in which
"Bank Night" has been held legal rely greatly upon the Mail
and Express Co. and the Yellow-Stone Kit cases for their
reasoning, we shall have more to say regarding the former
case later.
Counter-balanced against the cases offered by the appel-
lants, the People selected many authorities in New York and
' Id. at 78, 79 (14 App. Div.)
' Ibid. This conclusion of the court was made "in view of the fact that
the United States Supreme Court, in the leading case of Horner v. United
States, 147 U. S. 449, 13 Sup. Ct. 409 (1893), construing language similar to
that in the Penal Code, held that the purchase of such a bond was the purchase
of a chance in the lottery, or, in the language of the statute, an "enterprize
offering prizes dependent upon lot or chance".
"People v. Mail and Express Co., 231 N. Y. 586, 132 N. E. 898 (1921).4 1Ibid.
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other jurisdictions, to prove that the conviction of the appel-
lants was justified under the law. We will consider the
"foreign" cases first.
In Davenport v. The City of Ottawa, 42 a "gift enterprise"
was under consideration. There, a business house placed in
its show windows a locked box, with glass front, containing
twenty-five dollars in bills, and it advertised that all persons
buying goods in its store, paying fifty cents or more therefor,
would be given a key and that only one key would be given
out which would unlock the box and so permit the lucky
holder to take the money therein. It appeared also that the
defendant sold goods at its usual prices without extra charge
on account of said key. It was held, on appeal, that such
transactions were in effect sales of merchandise and lottery
tickets for an aggregate price, and that a conviction therefor
was right.
To the same effect was The State v. Mumford,43 which
was cited. There, prizes were offered to subscribers to the
Kansas City Times, each subscriber receiving a ticket en-
titling him to participate in a drawing of prizes, no extra
charge above the ordinary subscription price being made. The
court found this to be a lottery and that subscribers to the
newspaper bought at the one time, and for one and the same
consideration, the newspaper and the ticket in the lottery. In
so finding, the court pointed out that similar schemes have
been condemned by courts in other jurisdictions and referred
to United States v. Olney and State v. Clarke.44
The constitutional prohibition against all lotteries,4" and
the statutes enacted to enforce that prohibition, hereinbefore
set forth, having been brought to the attention of the learned
forum, cases heretofore adjudicated were then presented
to show that, for many years past, New York has steadily
frowned on "gift-enterprises".
Davenport v The City of Ottawa, 54 Kan. 711, 39 Pac. 708 (1895).
" State v. Mumford, 73 Mo. 647 (1879).
"United States v. Olney, 1 Abb. 275 (U. S. 1868); see also State v.
Clarke, 33 N. H. 335 (1856) ; Thomas v. People of Illinois, 59 Ill. 160 (1871) ;
Dunn v. People of Illinois, 40 Ili. 465 (1866); 2 WHARTON, CRImINAL LAW
(12th ed. 1932) § 1491.
' N. Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 9.
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It was argued that, under the authority of People ea rel.
Ellison v. Lavin,46 the convictions of the appellants, Miller
et al., were justified. There, the purchasers of cigars were
requested to retain the bands on same and, for every 100
bands on certain cigars, they would be entitled to four
estimates regarding the number of cigars upon which the
United States would collect taxes during a given month. To
those estimating most approximately the correct figure, large
prizes of cash or cigars would be awarded. Reversing the
orders of the Special Term and of the Appellate Division of
the First Department, the court found:
"That the persons among whom the distribution
is to be made pay a valuable consideration for the
chance when they purchase the cigars, the bands on
which entitle them to compete for the prizes, is settled
by authority." 47
It declared further:
"We think the distribution in this case is con-
trolled by chance within the meaning of the statute
and that, therefore, it is illegal. The scheme certainly
falls far within the requisites of a lottery as defined
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
Public Clearing House case,48 under a statute very
similar to our own." 49
In People v. Miller50 the purchase of the ticket of admission
to the theatre may be substituted for the purchase of the
cigars, and the bands attached thereto, in Ellison v. Lavin.
And we should bear in mind also that, while the appel-
lants in the Miller case conducted a drawing for the awarding
of the prizes, no such drawings were held in the Ellison v.
Lavin case, supra,--yet the Court of Appeals maintained that
6 People ex rel. Ellison v. Lavin, 179 N. Y. 164, 71 N. E. 753 (1904).
17 Id. at 168.
48 Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 24 Sup. Ct. 789 (1904).
'
9 Supra note 46, at 174 (179 N. Y.).
'0 People v. Miller, Cranides, and Kiley, 271 N. Y. 44, 2 N. E. (2d) 38
(1936).
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the laws regarding lotteries had been violated in the latter
case.
In so doing, the court upheld the strict constitutional
prohibition against all lotteries, no matter how harmless. In
brief, it followed the reasoning in N. Y. Almshouse v. Ameri-
can Art Union r1 wherein, in the following language, the
court declared that no matter how innocent the purpose of
the lottery might be, all lotteries are prohibited.
"Its mischiefs are certainly not so apparent, as
if its prizes were to be paid in money, or as it would
be, if framed for the purpose of enticing the necessi-
tous and improvident into its hazards. But this case
cannot be decided according to the views we may en-
tertain of the probable good or evil consequent upon
the execution of the scheme. The constitution took
away from the legislature the power of determining
whether this or any other lottery was of good or evil
tendency, and certainly did not intend to confer that
power on the judicial tribunals. If it were to be
admitted, that the scheme is entirely harmless in its
consequences, it would form no ground for making it,
by judicial construction, an exception to the general
and absolute constitutional prohibition. The consti-
tution of 1846 contains a provision against lotteries,
and the sale of lottery-tickets, substantially like that
in the constitution of 1821. The judgment below jnust
be affirmed." 52
To the same effect is Yegley v. Devlin'5 3 wherein a con-
cert was to be given and the proceeds derived from the admis-
sion thereto were to be devoted to charitable enterprises.
The face of the ticket sold for the concert indicated that the
bearer was entitled to be admitted to the concert, "and to
whatever gift- may be awarded its number." This referred
to the serial number on each ticket sold. Prizes to the amount
'N. Y. Almshouse v. American Art Union, 7 N. Y. 228 (1852).
2 Id. at 229.
SNegley v. Devlin, 12 Abb. Pr. 210 (N. Y. 1872).
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of $260,000 were to be distributed after the concert to the
holders of the winning numbers.
The court found that the scheme proposed constituted a
lottery and condemned it.
"The object of the scheme, and the purpose to
which it was designed, to bestow the proceeds, were
such as to commend them to a most favorable consid-
eration. But the worthiness and excellence of the
charities, does not remove the vice from the enterprise,
or make it lawful and proper."
In making this decision, the court was following the
judgment rendered in Rolfe v. Delmanr,54 which case was
"on all fours" with the Negley case, supra.
With the condemnation of New York so plainly evi-
denced by the decisions just quoted, the Court of Appeals,
in 1936, unanimously affirmed the orders and judgments of
the Appellate Division of the Second Department which, in
turn, had affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Ses-
sions of New York City, convicting the defendants of main-
taining a lottery. But the ruling of the distinguished forum
left something to be desired. The court stated in part:
"Defendants offered evidence tending to show the
possibility of participation in the chance by those
who bought no ticket of admission to the theatre and
in no way paid any valuable consideration for the
opportunity to share in the chance, but the trial court
rejected the credibility of such testimony. In view of
this rejection our decision in People v. Mail and EBv-
press Co.5 5 has no application. The issue of law, there-
fore, is whether a payment which entitles one to a
ticket of admission to the theatre plus a chance to win
a prize constitutes payment of a valuable considera-
tion for the chance." 56 (Italics ours.)
' Rolfe v. Delman, 30 N. Y. Super. Ct. (1868).
' People v. Mail and Express Co., 231 N. Y. 586, 132 N. E. 898 (1921).
People v. Miller, Cranides and Kiley, 271 N. Y. 44, 47, 2 N. E. (2d) 38(1936).
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Assuming that the trial court did not reject, but had
considered, the testimony offered by the appellants that non-
purchasers of admission tickets could participate in the
prize-drawing, would the appellate court's finding be differ-
ent? Would People v. Mail & Express Co. have been author-
ity for reversing the judgments of conviction?
If the court so intended to intimate, with all due defer-
ence to that learned tribunal, we think such a ruling would
be erroneous. This, we say, as a result of a close examina-
tion of that ca§e, the results of which study are now to be
set forth.57
As the facts of People v. Mail and Express Co. disclose,
the newspaper caused wide distribution of numbered cards,
gratis, announcing that the holders of such of these cards,
whose numbers might correspond to numbers later to be
drawn by the newspaper, would win certain cash prizes. One
did not need to buy a copy of the newspaper to read the
winning numbers, as the paper could be seen, without charge,
at certain places designated by, and enumerated in, the
paper. On these facts, the owners of the paper were charged
with violating the lottery law. They demurred on the ground
that the said facts, set forth in the information, did not con-
stitute a crime, and the demurrer was sustained by the trial
and the appellate courts, even though the trial court consid-
ered Section 21 of the Penal Law which stated:
"The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly
construed does not apply to this chapter or any of the'
provisions thereof, but all such provisions must be
construed according to the fair import of their terms,
to promote justice and effect the objects of the law!Y
(Italics ours.)
Now, what did the "terms" of Section 1370 of the Penal
Law import? The statute read:
"'A lottery' is a scheme for the distribution of
property by chance, among persons who have paid or
An analysis of this case is important because the ruling therein has been
followed in other jurisdictions as well as in New York.
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agreed to pay a valuable consideration for the chance,
whether called a lottery, raffle or gift enterprise or
by some other name." Is (Italics ours.)
It is plainly evident that the Legislature was condemn-
ing all such schemes, no matter by what names they might
be designated. "Some other name" precluded any exclusive
definition; it was all-embracing-provided all the elements
of a lottery were present. But the learned justices agreed
that the element of "consideration" was lacking in the Mail
and Express Go. case. They reached that conclusion in spite
of the fact that the prosecution presented "the cogent reason-
ing of Lord Alverstone, C. J., and Darling, J., in the King's
Bench Division, in a recent case,59 as to the facts substan-
tially like those now before us." This is the "cogent reason-
lig" referred to:
"The money for the prizes, however, comes out of
the receipts of the respondents, and these in their turn
come, to a considerable extent, from the people who
buy the paper, although no doubt the advertisements
may bring in a considerable sum. The persons who
receive the medals 60 therefore contribute collectively
(though each individual may not contribute) sums of
money which constitute the fund from, which the
profits of the newspaper, and also the money for the
prize winners in this competition, come. I adopt the
definitions of 'lottery' which have been cited to us in
the present case, and, looking at the real substance of
the scheme, I think that it falls within the narrowest
and most limited definition of a lottery, though it is
not necessary for the purpose of our decision to go so
far as that. If the scheme had been to deliver a medal
with each copy of the paper to the person buying that
copy, there could have been no question that it would
have been a lottery; in the present case the mischief
Same today.
"Willis v. Young, 1 L. R. 448 (K B. 1907).
' Numbered medals, instead of tickets, had been freely distributed; other-
wise the facts are the same as in the Pacific Mail and Express case.
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is really the same, and an inducement is held out to
the same class of people to buy copies of the paper,
and I am glad to say that I know of no statute, and
of no judicial decision, which compels me to hold that
this scheme is not a lottery." 61
It is submitted that this is sound reasoning, and, if fol-
lowed, would have saved the court from falling into error.
And error obtained also in the formation of the trial court's
opinion as will be seen by the following.
One of the judges, discussing Willis v. Young, supra,
quoted Justice Darling in this fashion:
"I do not intend to hold that a free and absolutely
gratuitous distributioft of chances, some of which
obtain prizes, would be a lottery.." 62
whereas the learned justice really said:
"I do not intend to hold that a free and absolutely
gratuitous distribution of chances, none of which have
been paid for, would be a lottery." (Italics ours.) 63
Obviously not. But to bring "Bank Night" under the
protection of Justice Darling's opinion, it would be neces-
sary, if we may resort to hyperbole, for the theatre owners
to throw the doors to their entertainment wide open, to all
and sundry, free of charge. Who can visualize this act of
philanthropy?
After long contemplation of the Pacific Mail and Ex-
press Co. case, it is submitted that the reasoning evidenced
by the opinion therein is erroneous; that the conclusion
could be correct is unlikely. The theory that prevailed in
this case was followed in a "Bank Night" case that was
decided in New York, subsequent to the decision of People
v. Miller, et al., and the conclusion was reached that the
lottery scheme under discussion was not a lottery. In that
'Willis v. Young, 1 L. ?. 448, 454-455 (K. B. 1907).
People v. Mail and Express Co., 231 N. Y. 586, 132 N. E. 898 (1921).
See note 60, supra.
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particular case,64 People v. Shafer, one of the rules of the
game was that the winner of the prize must be in the theatre,
or in the lobby, or in the street, so that within five minutes
he could claim the prize, and the trial court held that this
requirement furnished the "consideration" requisite to a lot-
tery. Reversing this finding of the City Court of Rochester
(Criminal Branch), the County Court of Monroe said:
"I fail to see how the requirement of the presence
of the participant in the theatre or lobby constitutes a
payment of a valuable consideration or an agreement
to pay it." 65
That this ruling of the County Court aforesaid (appar-
ently approved by the Court of Appeals) is not being fully
accepted, in at least one judicial department of New York,
is indicated by the decision in Simmons v. Randforce Amuse-
ment Corporation,6 where a prize-winner, having duly pre-
sented himself for the prize of $250, was denied the prize.
He brought suit to recover, and we read that:
"The defendant now moves to dismiss the com-
plaint for failure to state a cause of action, attacking
it on two grounds: First, that the complaint sets forth
no consideration for the promise of the defendant to
pay the prize money; and second, that if a considera-
tion can be spelled out, the contract is illegal and void,
as the payment of any consideration would reduce the
entire scheme to a lottery * * *." 67
The motion to dismiss was denied, the court accepting
that part of the decision in the Shafer case which held "Bank
Nights" legal, but rejecting the part which declared that no
consideration could be found passing from the winner to the
theatre owner, under circumstances similar to those prevail-
ing in the Simmons case.
People v. Shafer, 160 Misc. 174, 289 N. Y. Supp. 649, aff'd, 273 N. Y.
475, 6 N. E. (2d) 410 (1936) by a court divided 4-3.
Id. at 176.
162 Misc. 491, 293 N. Y. Supp. 745 (1937).
Id. at 492.
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A month later, another indication of the disinclination
of the courts to agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals
in the Shafer case was made evident, and again it fell to
the writer to debate the legality, or illegality, of "Bank
Night", before the justices of the Appellate Division of the
Second Department.
In this case, two defendants were convicted in the lower
court of unlawfully maintaining and operating a lottery
(Bank Night) in Brooklyn and appeals were taken there-
from. The judgments of conviction were unanimously af-
firmed,68 without opinion, even though two witnesses had
testified at the trial of the defendants: one, that he had regis-
tered to participate in the drawing without buying any
admission ticket; and the other, that he had won a prize at
defendant's theatre of $312.50, while standing outside of it
-a month after these appellants had been arrested-as a re-
sult of having registered, "free", some months prior thereto.
And, although the Shafer case was fully discussed upon
the argument for reversal, the learned court unanimously
affirmed the judgments of conviction-and the appellants'
attorneys, although representing large theatrical interests,
made no move to have the affirmance reviewed by the Court
of Appeals.
Is it possible definitely to state what the New York law
is in regard to that type of Bank Night where those who pay
admission to a theatre and those who do not may equally
participate in the distribution of prizes? It would seem that
the Court of Appeals has declared such a transaction not to
be a lottery. However, the later cases in courts of lower juris-
diction are disinclined to a complete acceptance of the de-
cision in People v. Shafer. This may be due to the fact that
the Court of Appeals wrote no opinion in the Shafer case and
there is consequently no way of determining whether the
acquittal was really affirmed on the reasoning of the court
below. Such is the rather unsatisfactory status of Bank
Night in New York today.
As for its status elsewhere, it is found, from a very good
People v. Vorzimer and Hughital, 250 App. Div. 739, 299 N. Y. Supp.
734 (2d Dept. 1937).
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survey of the situation,69 that since the writer argued the case
of People v. Miller, et al, "Bank Night" has received consid-
eration in many other jurisdictions, with the result that
Tennessee, California, New Hampshire, New Mexico and
Iowa regard it as a lawful enterprise, while Kansas, Michi-
gan, Massachusetts, Illinois, Louisiana, Texas, Georgia,
Washington and Alabama 70 (distinguishing the Yellow-
Stone Kit case) condemn it as illegal.
Most of the latter states base their disapproval on the be-
lief that, where there was an admission fee charged to some
participants and not to others, the plan was to deduct a cer-
tain percentage of the admission charged, and "use this frac-
tional fee to pay or offset the loss which might be occasioned
by the prize", 71 the increased number of patrons paying
admission to the theatre on the night of the drawing furnish-
ing, en masse, the required consideration.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOTTERY STATUTES.
Upon appeal, in the case of People v. Mifler, et al., here-
tofore discussed, the appellants raised the point that any
attempt to prevent them from distributing merchandise free
of charge would be "unconstitutional and void for uncer-
tainty as setting up no ascertainable standard for guidance".
It was answered that it was too late to raise the question of
constitutionality, for the first time, upon appeal 72 and we do
not believe that the appellate tribunal considered that ques-
tion in its findings against the appellants. However, it seems
certain that, if such consideration had been given, the judg-
ment affirming their conviction would have been unchanged.
This is maintained in view of what follows.
Some years ago, the country was swept by what was
designated as the trading-stamp scheme. Briefly, it was a
device to stimulate purchases of goods in local stores dealing
1 THE AMERICAN LAWYER (Sept. 1937) No. 1, 5-13.
'Grimes v. State, - Ala. -, 174 So. 900 (1937).
'Central States Theatre Corp. v. Patz, 11 F. Supp. 566 (D. C. S. D.
Iowa 1935).
People v. Raport, 193 App. Div. 135, 183 N. Y. Supp. 589 (1st Dept.
1920) ; People v. Sieke, 222 N. Y. 611, 118 N. E. 1073 (1917).
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in any and all kinds of commodities-groceries, meats, vege-
tables, hats, clothes, shoes, etc. When the customer made a
purchase, the store-keeper would give him a small premium
stamp for each ten cents he spent. After securing a thou-
sand or more of such stamps, the customer could present
them to the storekeeper and receive some commodity "free",
or he could take them to a central premium parlor (main-
tained by the company which printed and sold the stamps to
the storekeepers) and select a premium or prize, in return
for surrendering the stamps he had accumulated.
In time, this trading-stamp scheme to promote business
came under the scrutiny of the courts in many states and,
with few exceptions, it was held that any statutes or ordi-
nances designed to interfere with a merchant giving away
trading stamps or gifts to his customers, were unconstitu-
tional in that they violated those provisions of the federal
and state constitutions which guarantee to every one the
security of his liberty and his property.73
Eventually, the Supreme Court of the United States was
called upon to pass judgment on the status of such prohibit-
ing acts or ordinances in Matter of Gregory.7 4 In this case,
the statute involved made it a crime for a person to engage
in gift enterprises conducted "in any manner, as defined in
said act or otherwise", in the District of Columbia, and it
was urged that the prohibition contained in that statute
violated the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States by depriving the petitioner (who dealt in trad-
ing stamps) of liberty and property without due process of
law. But the nation's highest Court brushed aside the con-
tention that "gift enterprises" did not include the trading-
stamp scheme, by saying that:
"It cannot be said that the words 'gift-enterprise
business' are so uncertain as to make the prohibition
'Ex parte Hutchinson, 147 Fed. 950 (C. C. D. Ore. 1905); People v.
Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389, 17 N. E. 343 (1888) ; People v. Zimmerman, 102 App.
Div. 103, 92 N. Y. Supp. 497 (4th Dept. 1905); Ex parte Drevel, 147 Cal. 763,
88 Pac. 389 (1907) ; Denver v. Freauff, 39 Colo. 20, 82 Pac. 429 (1905) ; Hewin
v. Atlanta, 121 Ga. 723, 49 S. E. 765 (1905); State v. Dalton, 22 R I. 771,
46 Atl. 234 (1900) ; State v. Dodge, 76 Vt. 197, 56 Atl. 983 (1904).
' Matter of Gregory, 219 U. S. 210, 31 Sup. Ct. 143 (1911).
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nugatory, or that they necessarily include conduct
which lies outside the range of legislative interference
in the exercise of the police power. While these words
are general, they may be regarded as embracing a class
of transactions which the legislature is competent to
condemn. Thus, a 'gift enterprise' has been defined
to be 'a scheme for the division or distribution of
certain articles of property, to be determined by
chance, amongst those who have taken shares in the
scheme'." 75
In Ohampion v. Ames 76 the right of legislative bodies to
prohibit lotteries was also upheld, as will be seen from the
following:
Champion, with others, was accused of violating the
"Act for the Suppression of Lottery Traffic through National
and Interstate Commerce and the Postal Service", 77 in that
he and his associates conspired to send lottery tickets, via
express, from one state to another. The constitutionality of
that statute was attacked, the defendants claiming that the
act of expressing the said tickets from state to state did not
constitute commerce, and further that no valid act of Con-
gress could be made to prohibit, under penalties, such traffic,
under that clause of the national Constitution giving Con-
gress the right "to regulate commerce with foreign nations
and among the several states". Answering these two ques-
tions, in their order, the United States Supreme Court found
that interstate "commerce" means more than the carrying
from one state to another by independent carriers of things
or commodities that are ordinary subjects of traffic," and
which have in themselves a recognized value in money." In
justification of this finding, the Court wrote:
"The cases cited, however, sufficiently indicate the
grounds upon which this court has proceeded when
determining the meaning and scope of the commerce
BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY (Rawle's ed. 1928) 884; BLACK, LAw Dic-
TIONARY (2d ed. 1910) 539; see also Lohman, 81 Ind. 15, 17 (1881) Winston
v. Beeson, 135 N. C. 271, 279, 65 L. R. A. 167, 47 S. E. 457 (1904).
188 U. S. 321, 23 Sup. Ct. 143 (1910).
28 STAT. 963 (1895).
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clause. They show that commerce among the states
embraces navigation, intercourse, communication,
traffic, the transit of persons, and the transmission of
messages by telegraph- They also show that the power
to regulate commerce among the several. states - is
vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a
single government, having in its constitution the same
restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found
in the Constitution of the United States; that such
power is plenary, complete in itself, and may be ex-
erted by Congress to its utmost extent, subject only
to such limitations as the Constitution imposes upon
the exercise of the powers granted by it; and that in
determining the character of the regulations to be
adopted, Congress has a large discretion which is not
to be controlled by the courts, simply because, in their
opinion, such regulations may not be the best or most
effective that could be employed." 78
More specifically the Court found that the sending of the
tickets, by express, from one state to another constituted
"traffic" and therefore "commerce". 79
Addressing itself to the second point, that the statute
gave Congress only the right to regulate, as distinguished
from "prohibiting", the Court inquired:
"If lottery traffic, carried on through interstate
commerce, is a matter of which Congress may take
cognizance and over which its power may be exerted,
can it be possible that it must tolerate the traffic, and
simply regulate the manner in which it may be carried
on? Or may not Congress,"0 for the protection of the
people of all the states, and under the power to regu-
late interstate commerce, devise such means, within
the scope of the Constitution, and not prohibited by
it, as will drive that traffic out of commerce among
the states?" 81
Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321, 23 Sup. Ct. 143 (1910).
TO Id. at 354.
Substitute "State Legislatures" for "Congress", and the analogy is clear.
Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321, 355, 23 Sup. Ct. 143 (1910).
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And, in answer to its own question, the Court declared:
"'The framers of the Constitution never intended
that the legislative power of the nation should find
itself incapable of disposing of a subject-matter specifi-
cally committed to its charge.' Re Rahrer, 140 U. S.
545, 563, sub nom. Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 35 L. ed.
572, 577, 11 Sup. Ct. 865, 869. If the carrying of lot-
tery tickets from one state to another be interstate
commerce, and if Congress is of opinion that an effec-
tive regulation for the suppression of lotteries, carried
on through such commerce, is to make it a criminal
offense to cause lottery tickets to be carried from one
state to another, we know of no authority in the courts
to hold that the means thus devised are not appropri-
ate and necessary to protect the country at large
against a species of interstate commerce which, al-
though in general use and somewhat favored in both
national and state legislation in the early history of
the country, has grown into disrepute, and has become
offensive to the entire people of the nation. It is a
kind of traffic which no one can be entitled to pursue
as of right." 82
Although the Chief Justice, and three of his distin-
guished colleagues, voted to dissent, the opinion which pre-
vailed held that the Congressional Act of 1895, heretofore
mentioned, was valid and that Congress was within its powers
when it passed this Act.
And in New York, the right of the Legislature to pass
statutes condemning all lotteries, be they gift enterprises
or not, is clearly implied in N. Y. Almshouse v. American
Art Union.83
In this case, the constitution of the American Art Union
(formerly the Apollo Association), a corporate body, pro-
vided that works of art purchased by it with money paid by
its subscribers, should be distributed by lot among those sub-
scribers once a year. Each subscriber, we may add, in addi-
82Id. at 358.
'7 N. Y. 228 (1852).
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tion to receiving a chance to win one of those pictures, also
received an engraving of an American painting, as well as
the issues of the "Bulletin of the American Art Union." The
sanction of the Legislature to distribute the works of art by
lot was given by an act of that body passed on January 29,
1844. A few years later, on the eve of such distribution by
lot, the Overseers of the Poor began a proceeding against the
American Art Union to recover the penalty provided by
law,8 4 where property is distributed by-lot. The Union con-
tended that the legislative sanction above mentioned made
its distribution of pictures lawful, and that it had thereby
repealed the statute against lotteries and raffles, as far as the
Union was concerned. However, the Court of Appeals of
New York held that the act of the Legislature aforesaid could
not exempt the Union from the rigor of the eleventh section
of the seventh article of the State Constitution of 1821, which
provided that:
"No lottery shall hereafter be authorized in this
state; and the legislature shall pass laws to prevent
the sale of all lottery tickets within this state, except
in lotteries already provided for by law." 85 (Italics
ours.)
The tribunal of last resort in this state was not receptive
to the argument made by the Union that the constitutional
prohibition just recited condemned only public lotteries, for
cash prizes, conducted as a means of raising state funds but,
instead, declared that lotteries had never been created in
New York for the purpose of general revenue, so the prohibi-
tion could not apply to them. As private lotteries had been
consistently frowned upon since 1721 (wheh New York was
a province), the prohibition must have been directed at all
lotteries, the court concluded, and affirmed the judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs, Overseers of the Poor, one judge
dissenting.
In view of this sweeping ruling of the Court of Appeals,
8 4R. S. pt. 1, c. 20, tit. 8, 33, modified now in § 1384, PENAL LAW.
Embodied, and broadened, in Article I, § 9, of the present Constitution
of New York State.
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we believe that any question of the constitutionality of the
statutes, in New York, passed by direction of Article I, Sec-
tion 9 of the state's constitution, and under which Miller
et al. had been prosecuted, would have been answered ad-
versely to them had this issue been determined.
CONCLUSIONS.
1. It is submitted that the conditions demanding atten-
dance at the theatre to register, whether with, or without
charge, attendance at the theatre, either in or outside of it
on the night of the drawing, and the condition that the winner
must claim his prize within a few moments time, or else for-
feit it, furnish sufficient consideration for the promise, and
hence a lottery is created-the other elements of a drawing
for a prize by lot being present, of course. One of the great
legal minds of our age, Mr. Justice Cardozo, as Chief Justice
of the Court of Appeals of New York, showed his sympathy
with such reasoning in the opinion written by him in Alle-
gheny College v. National Chautauqua Bank Co.'86 wherein
he quotes approvingly from Section 112 of the eminent Pro-
fessor Williston's treatise on contracts as follows:
"It is often difficult to determine whether words of
condition in a promise indicate a request for consid-
eration or state a mere condition in a gratuitous prom-
ise. An aid, though not a conclusive test in deter-
mining which construction of the promise is more
reasonable is an inquiry whether the happening of the
condition will be a benefit to the promisor. If so, it
is a fair inference that the happening was requested
as a consideration." 87
2. The legal prohibition of lotteries is, and should be,
directed at the substance of the scheme, regardless of its
-246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E. 173 (1927).
"The happening of the condition", in Bank Night, is the attendance of
the prize-winner, either in the theatre or outside of it, at the time of the
drawing. Obviously, the presence of a crowd outside the theatre attracts
attention to it, and advertises it. Those inside the theatre furnish "considera-
tion" by purchasing tickets of admission thereto.
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form, and all attempts to evade the spirit of the lottery laws
should be met with the reasoning set forth in N. Y. Almshowse
v. American Art Union Is condemning all such attempts:
"The prohibition was not aimed at the objects for
which lotteries had been authorized, but at that par-
ticular mode of accomplishing such objects."
GmORGu F. PALMER.
Brooklyn, N. Y.
-37 N. Y. 228 (1852).
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